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THE EFFECT OF RISING INCOME INEQUALITY ON TAXATION AND PUBLIC
EXPENDITURES: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. MUNICIPALITIES AND
SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 1970–2000
Leah Boustan, Fernando Ferreira, Hernan Winkler, and Eric M. Zolt*
Abstract—The income distribution in many developed countries widened
dramatically from 1970 to 2000. Some scholars argue that income
inequality contributes to a host of social ills by undermining voters’ will-
ingness to support public expenditures. In contrast, we find that growing
income inequality is associated with an expansion in government reven-
ues and expenditures on a wide range of services in U.S. municipalities
and school districts. Results are robust to a number of model specifica-
tions, including instrumental variables that address the endogeneity of the
local income distribution. Our results are inconsistent with models pre-
dicting that heterogeneous societies provide lower levels of public goods.
I. Introduction
OVER the past thirty years, the income distribution haswidened dramatically in the United States and many
other developed countries (Piketty & Saez, 2003; Smeed-
ing, 2004). Income inequality is correlated with several
negative outcomes, including high crime rates, low levels
of education achievement, and poor health.1 Yet little is
known about whether these relationships are causal and, if
so, the channels through which a widening income distribu-
tion might translate into these social ills.
One frequently proposed mechanism for the relationship
between inequality and social outcomes is that income ine-
quality reduces voters’ willingness to support taxation and
public expenditures. Some political economy models sug-
gest that in heterogeneous societies, residents cannot agree
on the composition of public goods or on the taxes and
charges used to fund them (Benabou, 1996, 2000). In parti-
cular, rich households may rely on private alternatives to
public goods, and the poor may prioritize personal con-
sumption over public contributions, generating dissent be-
tween the ends and the middle of the income distribution
(Epple & Romano, 1996).2 On the other hand, models based
on the median voter theorem predict that a widening of the
income distribution will encourage the electorate to support
higher taxes and greater public expenditures, provided that
the absolute tax burden increases with income while the
benefits of government activity are more equally shared
(Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Alesina & Rodrik, 1994; Pers-
son & Tabellini, 1994). Residents of unequal societies may
also have greater needs, leading altruistic voters to support
social programs.
Existing empirical work has not established a definitive
relationship between income inequality and the size of the
public sector.3 Two types of identification problems com-
plicate estimation of the empirical relationship between
income inequality and public goods provision. The cross-
country variation often used for this exercise suffers from
omitted variable bias; that is, countries with high income
inequality may also have other characteristics that could
limit the size of the public sector. Cross-state comparisons
also suffer from endogenous household sorting. If low- or
high-income families migrate to states with high public
expenditures, the positive association observed in the litera-
ture between state public expenditures and income inequal-
ity may be spurious.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between
income inequality and government finances in municipali-
ties and school districts in the United States from 1970 to
2000. Local government represents a large segment of the
economy; in fiscal year 2009, local governments disbursed
more than $3 trillion for such important services as educa-
tion and public safety.4
Our study has several advantages over existing empirical
work. First, the large number of local governments in our
data exhibit much greater variation in income inequality
over time than do the small number of countries or states
used in previous studies. A large sample size allows us to
separately control for changes in the top end or bottom end
of the income distribution and for initial levels of inequal-
ity, thus ruling out a mechanical association between tax
revenues and rising income for the affluent. Second, we
develop an instrumental variable strategy to mitigate con-
cerns about potential reverse causality from the endogenous
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1 See Kawachi et al., (1997), Kennedy et al., (1998), Fajnzylber, Leder-
man, & Loayza (2002), and the research summarized in Wilkinson and
Pickett (2009). For an opposing view, see Deaton and Lubotsky (2003).
2 Heterogeneity can also reduce social capital between residents, which
may undermine trust, norms of reciprocity, and support for local govern-
ment activity (Putnam, 2000; Boix & Posner, 1998; Costa & Kahn, 2003).
3 In a cross-section of countries, results tend to show that countries with
high levels of inequality, like the United States, engage in less public
spending (see, for example, Lindert, 1994, 1996; Moene & Wallerstein,
2005; Schwabish, Smeeding, & Osberg, 2006; an exception is Shelton,
2007). In contrast, comparisons across U.S. states and within states over
time find that rising income inequality is accompanied by higher govern-
ment expenditures and increasing progressivity in the state tax code
(Chernick, 2005; Schwabish, 2008).
4 State governments accounted for $1.36 trillion in expenditures in
2009, while all other local governments (cities, school districts, and so
on) accounted for $1.72 trillion. The federal government spent $3.52 tril-
lion in 2009. Beyond cities and school districts, counties and special dis-
tricts also provide local services, although these governmental units repre-
sent a relatively small share of the total expenditures. These facts were
compiled from http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/.
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sorting of households across localities. Our instrument pre-
dicts the income distribution in a city or school district at a
point in time by applying the national patterns of income
growth to the initial (1970) income distribution in an area.
By design, our instrument cannot be influenced by mobility
into and out of communities; rather, it isolates the compo-
nent of change in the local income distribution that is driven
by national trends, such as changes in the return to skill and
in labor market institutions.5
We find no evidence that an increase in income inequality
reduces expenditures on public services in cities or school
districts; rather, as the income distribution widens, localities
increase their revenue collection and expenditures. Our pre-
ferred IV estimate suggests that the average increase in the
city-level Gini coefficient (5 points) leads to an $88 increase
in expenditures per resident and can explain 22% of the
growth in municipal expenditures over this period. We rule
out a mechanical relationship between rising top-end
inequality and the size of the local tax base by flexibly con-
trolling for the share of households in each segment of the
income distribution. Among school districts, the average
change in the Gini is associated with a $514 increase in local
property tax revenue per pupil with a corresponding $697
decline in state transfers, values that are proportional to the
effects of inequality on municipal spending due the higher
levels of educational expenditures. In other words, it appears
that state systems of school finance equalization have
undone much of the effect of rising income inequality on
local revenue collection at the school district level.
We also investigate how changes in the income distribu-
tion affect the composition of local expenditures. Rising
income inequality leads to extra spending on police ser-
vices, fire protection, and road maintenance. In related
results, we find that growing racial fractionalization is cor-
related with larger government expenditures across a wide
range of expenditure categories, casting doubt on earlier
findings that more racially fragmented cities spend a smal-
ler share of their budget on public goods (Alesina, Baqir, &
Easterly, 1999; see also Cutler, Elmendorf, & Zeckhauser,
1993; Hopkins, 2009).
Our results are consistent with recent work by Corcoran
and Evans (2010), which documents a positive relationship
between income inequality and educational expenditures
at the school district level.6 These findings challenge the
hypothesis that income inequality reduces the provision of
public goods from local governments in the United States
because heterogeneous societies are unable to compromise
on common public goods and services.7 Our results are
instead supportive of a median voter model, which posits
that rising inequality lowers the tax price of public services
for the median voter.
The applicability of the median voter framework depends
on the institutional setting. In particular, the median voter
model addresses tax revenue that is both raised and spent in
the same locality. Yet by 2000, over half of all school fund-
ing was provided by the state in the form of intergovern-
mental transfers. We show that this centralized funding
arrangement counteracts the positive relationship between
income inequality and locally raised property tax revenue
within school districts. Furthermore, predictions from the
median voter model depend on both the incidence of the tax
instruments used to raise revenue and the distribution of
benefits from the resulting expenditures. We explore varia-
tion by revenue source and expenditure category; overall,
we find a positive relationship between income inequality
and all categories of government activity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section discusses our measures of income inequality
and government activity at the local level. Section III
describes our panel estimation, as well as an instrument for
changes in the local income distribution. Section IV docu-
ments the positive relationship between changes in local
inequality and growing revenues and expenditures at the
city and school district levels. Section V concludes.
II. Data on Income Distribution and Government
Activity at the Local Level
A. Income Inequality
We collect decadal data on the income distribution and
expenditures and revenues from 1970 to 2000 for a large
number of cities and school districts. Our municipality and
school district samples consist of balanced panels of every
Census-defined place (incorporated city or town) or school
district with 2,500 or more residents in 1970. We exclude
the 903 municipalities that were directly responsible for
providing education services, leaving us with a sample of
3,383 cities and towns and 8,884 school districts.8 Note that
the majority of our municipal sample is made up of small
5 A full review of the literature on the causes of rising inequality is
beyond the scope of this paper. Recent work by Autor, Katz, and Kearney
(2006) emphasizes that technological change is complementary with both
low- and high-skilled labor, leading to polarization in the labor market.
For a discussion on the role of labor market institutions, see Blau and
Kahn (1996) and Lee (1999) specifically on the minimum wage.
6 Our results were generated independent of Corcoran and Evans’s
(2010) recent study. We reach similar conclusions despite using different
methods to measure income inequality within school districts and devel-
oping a different instrument for changes in inequality at the local level.
7 However, previous work using historical data at the state or local level
finds that, before World War II, unequal communities raised less local
revenue and provided fewer common goods and services (Goldin & Katz,
1999; Ramcharan, 2010; Galor, Moav, & Vollrath, 2009; Zolt, 2009).
8 The Census of Population provides demographic information for
11,687 and 14,405 school districts in 1970 and 2000, respectively. We
use the School District Geographic Reference File for 1970 to combine
the demographic information with expenditure data from the Census of
Governments. The sample consists of the 8,884 school districts that could
be matched between 1970 and 2000. This sampling rule eliminates school
districts that eventually disappear from the data due to consolidations
with other districts. We choose not to aggregate districts that eventually
consolidate because the political economy mechanism that we have in
mind pertains to the actual voters and residents of a district. As a result, a
component of the measured variation in income inequality over time
within a district will be due to mergers with neighboring districts.
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towns: 65% of the municipalities in the sample have fewer
than 10,000 residents.
Because of Census privacy restrictions, we cannot
recover the full income distribution at the local level.
Instead, we use published Census reports, which indicate
the number of households in a jurisdiction in each of fifteen
to twenty income categories, to generate an (approximate)
income distribution. We assign each household an income
level equal to the median income in its bin by decade as cal-
culated from Census microdata. We then generate Gini
coefficients at the local level for this modified income dis-
tribution.9
In 1970, the average municipality in our sample had a
Gini coefficient of 0.32, compared to the national Gini coef-
ficient of 0.39 (table 1). By 2000, the Gini coefficient in the
average municipality increased by 5.5 points to 0.38. How-
ever, the average increase obscures a tremendous variation
across municipalities. The Gini coefficient increased by less
than 1 point (or even decreased) in one-third of the cities
in our sample, while in another third, the Gini coefficient
increased by more than 5 points.
B. City Finances
The Census (and Surveys) of Governments provide infor-
mation on municipal revenues and expenditures by detailed
category. The first panel of table 1 contains summary statis-
tics on the sources of revenue and the categories of current
expenditures at the municipality level. All values are
reported in year 2000 dollars. In the average municipality,
expenditures per resident doubled from $459 in 1970 to
$867 by 2000. Spending on infrastructure, including roads,
sewers, water, and electricity, comprises 44% of average
municipal budgets, while spending on police and fire pro-
tection makes up another 21%. In comparison, redistribu-
tion in the form of direct public welfare and expenditures
on health and public hospitals contributes a negligible
amount (less than 5%) of the typical municipal budget.
In 1970, property taxes were the largest source of munici-
pal revenue, accounting for 33% of total proceeds. By 2000,
property taxes declined to only 22% of revenue, replaced in
large part by intergovernmental transfers and direct charges
for services.10 Sales taxes also increased from very low
levels in 1970 to 12% of total revenue in 2000. Property and
sales taxes tend to be regressive in the sense that they
require higher tax payments as a share of total income
from poor households (Suits, 1977; Phares, 1980).11 Direct
charges may be even more regressive than property taxation
because they are levied on a per house basis rather than tied
to the value of the home.12 On the other side of the ledger,
intergovernmental transfers are often financed through pro-
gressive state or federal income taxes; however, the tax bur-
den for these transfers may disproportionately fall on house-
holds living outside the locality in question.
We caution that higher government expenditures need
not be synonymous with a higher quality or quantity of pub-
lic services for the average resident. First, the majority of
TABLE 1.—SUMMARY STATISTICS: MUNICIPAL AND SCHOOL DISTRICT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES, 1970–2000
















1970 mean 0.320 446.7 146.5 95.0 89.5 3.1 117.0
1970 SD (0.054) (301.9) (117.5) (143.2) (143.2) (7.1) (166.9)
D 1970–2000 0.055 426.9 44.1 104.7 104.7 57.3 123.4
General








1970 mean 458.9 75.6 31.2 60.3 0.5 20.4 272.7
1970 SD (436.5) (45.3) (34.4) (34.9) (7.7) (117.1) (398.4)
D 1970–2000 408.3 56.5 20.0 9.8 1.6 10.4 308.8















1970 mean 0.329 4005.4 3937.6 1900.7 1828.8 212.7 296.0
1970 SD (0.052) (1407.6) (1622.9) (1354.7) (869.8) (157.8) (268.9)
D 1970–2000 0.034 3,626.4 3,739.0 763.0 2,534.2 15.7 307.6
Revenues and expenditures are reported in 2000 dollars. We provide the mean of each variable in 1970, the standard deviation in 1970 in parentheses, and the average change from 1970–2000 in italics. The municipal-
ity statistics are for the 3,383 cities and towns with at least 2,500 residents in 1970 that do not provide education services. The school district statistics reflect the 8,884 districts with more than 2,500 residents in 1970.
9 Without a full set of microdata at the municipal level, we are unable
to calculate other measures of inequality, such as the 90-10 ratio, with
sufficient accuracy.
10 The relative decline in property taxes from 1970 to 2000 was part of a
larger decline in the use of local property taxes over the twentieth century
(Oates & Schwab, 2004; Sokoloff & Zolt, 2005). This trend was accelerated
in the 1980s by statutory limits on the level or growth of property tax rates in
some states.
11 Specific features of the tax system, including exemptions for food
and other items from sales taxes or initial threshold exemptions from
property taxes, can affect the incidence of these instruments. There is sig-
nificant scholarly debate about the true incidence of the property tax (see
Mieszkowski, 1972; Aaron, 1974; Musgrave, 1974; Hamilton, 1976).
12 The largest categories of direct charges are for sewers (23%), hospi-
tals (20%), airports (8%), and sanitation services (8%).
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government expenditures covers the wages and salaries of
municipal workers, increases in which may not translate
into a higher quality of service provision. Second, anecdotal
evidence suggests that a greater share of city services is
directed toward high-income neighborhoods; however, with
existing data sets, we cannot observe how municipal ser-
vices are allocated within the jurisdiction. Finally, we note
that local governments may expand certain programs in
order to combat new social problems associated with rising
income inequality, thereby leaving the level of public ser-
vices unchanged. For example, inequality has been linked
to higher rates of violent crime (Fajnzylber, Lederman, &
Loayza, 2002). Cities may hire additional police officers to
combat the higher crime rates, resulting in more govern-
ment spending without net improvements in public safety.
C. School District Finances
The second panel of table 1 presents the descriptive sta-
tistics for our school district sample. In 1970, the typical
district spent $3,937 per pupil. By 2000, this total nearly
doubled to $7,676 per pupil. The sources of school district
revenue changed dramatically over this period. While in
1970, school revenues were evenly split between local
property taxes and intergovernmental transfers, local prop-
erty taxes made up only 35% of the average school district
budget by 2000.
The changing pattern of revenues in our sample reflects
the increasing centralization of K–12 funding over time.
States began to supplement local revenues for education ser-
vices in the mid-twentieth century. At that time, state aid
was typically disbursed as a flat grant per pupil, with addi-
tional funds provided to poor districts (Hoxby, 2001). In
1965, the federal government began disbursing school fund-
ing through Title I of the Elementary and Secondary School
Act (Cascio, et al., 2010). As a result, by 1970, locally raised
revenue accounted for only 60% of school district budgets.
More recently, the use of local revenue sources, even as a
supplement to state aid, has been challenged in some states.
These objections arise because property taxes allow
wealthy districts to raise more revenue than poor districts at
the same tax rate, thereby generating an association be-
tween the level of wealth in a district and its level of school
funding. Starting with the Serrano v. Priest decision in
California (1971), a number of state supreme courts have
ruled that existing systems of local school finance are
unconstitutional.13
In response to these legal challenges, states have adopted
various plans to equalize school funding across districts
(Hoxby, 2001; Metzler, 2003). The most common approach
has been to modify a state’s aid formula in order to directly
supplement districts with smaller local property tax capa-
city. Some states also guarantee that districts will be able to
raise a certain level of revenue at a given tax rate; the dif-
ference between locally raised revenue and the guaranteed
level is then made up by the state. Following this wave of
reforms, the share of school revenues raised through local
property taxes declined from 60% in 1970 to 35% in 2000.
III. Estimating the Relationship Between Income
Inequality and Government Activity
A. Basic Specification for Municipalities
The relationship between income inequality and public
finances can be described by
yit ¼ bðGiniÞit þ CXit þ Rit þ eit eit ¼ ai þ tit; ð1Þ
where i indexes a city or town in Census year t, y is a local
public finance outcome such as total expenditures, Gini is
the Gini coefficient, and the coefficient b indicates the esti-
mated effect of income inequality on local finances. X con-
tains a set of time-varying city characteristics, including
total population; the share of the population that is black,
Hispanic, or over 65 years of age; and median household
income. Our preferred specification controls for median
income, which in part determines the preferences of the
median (decisive) voter for public versus private spending.
We also report results that control for mean income, which
may be a better measure of the size of a locality’s tax base.
Rit is a set of time-specific dummy variables for the nine
Census regions. eit captures the unobserved determinant of
local finances, which depends on a permanent component
ai and a transitory component uit.
Pooling four decadal observations from 1970 to 2000 for
each area, we estimate
Dyit ¼ bðDGiniÞitþ CDXit þ UðRit  Rit1Þ þ Dtit: ð2Þ
This first-difference specification absorbs the permanent
component of the error term (ai). The coefficient of interest
(b) indicates the relationship between changes in the Gini
coefficient and changes in government revenue or expendi-
ture within a municipality over time, holding constant
changes in median income and basic demographics. Deca-
dal changes in the Census region fixed effects (Rit – Rit1)
account for the fact that each Census region has a distinct
time trend in levels of government finances during this per-
iod; for example, regions in the South started out with low
levels of government expenditure and were converging with
the rest of the county. For the rest of the paper, we refer to
equation (2) as the OLS specification.
The covariates X in equations (1) and (2) need not be
exogenous. For example, the fraction of blacks in a city
could potentially be affected by changes in inequality and
13 Differences in school funding on the basis of local property wealth
have been found to violate rights to equal protection under some state
constitutions (Briffault, 2006). In other states, local financing violates
constitutional provisions requiring that the state provide an adequate ele-
mentary and secondary education to all students. Claims under the federal
equal protection clause were denied by the Supreme Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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therefore be an intermediate outcome. The inclusion of
intermediate outcomes could potentially bias our estimates
of the impact of inequality on public finances. Section IVA
provides a robustness test that excludes race from equation
(2). We now turn to the more general issue of household
sorting and how instrumental variables can be used to deal
with this confounder.
B. Instrumental Variable for Income Inequality
Equation (2) is not sufficient on its own to establish a
causal relationship between income inequality and local
government finances. The income distribution may affect
government activity through a number of channels: the pre-
ferences of local voters, compensatory transfers from the
state and federal government, or simply a mechanical rela-
tionship between inequality and the size of the local tax
base. However, it is also possible that changes in govern-
ment expenditures could induce shifts in the local income
distribution. For instance, an increase in local expenditures
may attract wealthy households that prefer more and higher-
quality public services even at the expense of higher taxes.
These high-income arrivals would widen the local income
distribution.
To mitigate concerns about this form of reverse causality,
we construct an instrumental variable that is correlated with
changes in an area’s Gini coefficient but is not otherwise
associated with changes in local revenues or expenditures.
In particular, we predict the income distribution of a munici-
pality or school district at time t based on the area’s initial
income distribution and national patterns of income growth;
we then use the Gini coefficient for this predicted distribu-
tion as an instrument for the actual Gini coefficient. In prac-
tical terms, we start with the initial (1970) tallies of house-
holds by income bin in a locality. We then allow the income
level of households in this initial distribution to grow over
time according to the actual change in median income by
income bin and decade from Census microdata.14 In other
words, the initial income distribution in an area serves as a
set of weights indicating how national income growth likely
affects each locality. For example, in the 1980s, the income
level of households in the top income bin grew faster than
those for the rest of the distribution. The instrument will
therefore predict greater changes in the Gini coefficient over
the 1980s in municipalities that started out with a large num-
ber of high-income households in 1970.
By freezing the distribution of households across bins in
1970, we foreclose the possibility that richer or poorer
households move into a town in search of a given bundle of
public goods. It is important to note that our instrument can-
not address the possibility that rising inequality due to
higher incomes at the top end of the income distribution
mechanically increases government expenditures through
an expansion of the tax base. We consider this possibility
below in a series of robustness tests.
We present the first-stage relationship between the actual
and predicted Gini coefficients figure 1 in both level and
changes. We find a strong positive relationship between the
two measures, suggesting that much of the change in local
income distributions from 1970 to 2000 was driven by
trends in income growth rather than by in- and out-mobility
of households from the top or bottom of the income distri-
bution. The coefficient for this first-stage relationship at the
municipality level is 0.746 (SE ¼ 0.030) and is reported in
table 4. The F-statistic on the relationship between the
FIGURE 1.—FIRST-STAGE REGRESSION: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTUAL AND
SYNTHETIC GINI COEFFICIENTS AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL, 1970–2000
Panel A: Each point in the scatter diagram represents a municipality’s actual and predicted Gini coeffi-
cients. Gini coefficients are calculated using the income bins from Census reports and the median income
of each bin from Census microdata. The computation of predicted Gini coefficients is described in sec-
tion IIIB.
Panel B: Each point in the scatter diagram represents the residual change in a municipality’s actual
and predicted Gini coefficients over a decade after controlling for changes in population, share of black
and Hispanic population, median income, share of individuals older than 65 and regional trends.
14 In particular, we convert the end points of each income bin in 1970
from absolute income levels into percentiles of the income distribution.
For example, the first income bin includes households earning up to
$1,000 in 1970 or up to the 3.7th percentile of the income distribution in
that year. We then calculate income growth by decade for the resulting
percentile ranges. Results are qualitatively similar when we allow
changes in median income by bin and decade to vary by region.
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actual and synthetic Gini coefficients is 975.77, surpassing
the conventional threshold for a strong instrument by two
orders of magnitude.
C. Additional Specification for School Districts
Analyzing the relationship between income inequality
and school district revenues requires additional care
because of substantial changes in the organization of school
finance over this period. In particular, we want to allow for
the possibility that an increase in income inequality may
have different effects in states with and without school
finance equalization plans. Under a state equalization plan,
districts that experience rising income inequality due to
income growth for the rich may be heavily taxed, whereas
districts with inequality driven by falling incomes among
the poor may be heavily subsidized.
We define a school finance reform (SFR) indicator vari-
able equal to 1 in the fourteen states whose systems of
school finance were declared unconstitutional by the state
supreme court between 1970 and 2000.15 Equation (3) inter-
acts the state reform variable with changes in the school dis-
trict-level Gini coefficient. We estimate
Dyit ¼ hðSFRÞit þ b1ðDGiniÞit þ b2ðDGini SFRÞit
þ CDXit þ UðRit  Rit1Þ þ tit; ð3Þ
where i indexes school districts and t indicates the Census
decade (t ¼ 1970, 2000). Note that for this specification, we
consider a single long-run change in school expenditures
from 1970 to 2000 in each district in order to allow the
reforms of the 1970s and 1980s time to take hold. The coef-
ficient b1 summarizes the average relationship between
changes in income inequality and changes in revenues or
expenditures per pupil. The coefficient b2 tests whether this
relationship is different in states that fell under court order
to reform their system of school finance by 2000. We also
allow the effect of district-level median income to vary
according to a state’s school finance regime. States that
did not face a court order over this period may have
reformed their school finance systems preemptively in order
to avoid the threat of litigation (Metzler, 2003). In this case,
states with and without court-ordered reforms will respond
equivalently to changes in inequality, leading the coeffi-
cients on the interaction term (b2) to be indistinguishable
from 0.
IV. Results
A. Impact of Income Inequality on Municipalities
We start our empirical analysis by considering the rela-
tionship between income inequality and government activ-
ity at the municipality level. Table 2 presents OLS esti-
mates of equation (2), which evaluates the relationship
between changes in income inequality and changes in gov-
ernment revenue or expenditure within cities and towns
over time. We report results for the full sample and a modi-
fied sample that excludes outliers. In particular, we drop the
municipalities with the largest 1% and smallest 1% of
changes in either the Gini coefficient or in municipal reven-
ues by decade. In both cases, we find that an increase in
inequality leads to modest growth in municipal revenues
and expenditures. The coefficients imply that a 5 point
increase in the Gini coefficient, the average change in
the Gini over this period, is associated with a $19 to
$27 increase in expenditures per capita.16 Table 2 also
reports coefficients on the other municipality characteristics
TABLE 2.—OLS ESTIMATES, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUNICIPALITY CHARACTERISTICS AND REVENUE/EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA, 1970–2000
General Revenue General Expenditure
Full Sample Drop Outliers Full Sample Drop Outliers
Gini coefficient 460.8** 382.4*** 532.9** 313.5***
(208.9) (106.0) (208.9) (117.8)
ln(median income) 219.7*** 182.1*** 254.4*** 193.8***
(36.1) (25.9) (40.9) (26.2)
ln(population) 211.7*** 121.5*** 215.7*** 127.4***
(33.7) (15.1) (34.9) (15.8)
Share black 152.3* 90.9* 146.4 79.2
(85.3) (50.4) (91.4) (57.7)
Share Hispanic 152.3* 151.9*** 54.3 168.5**
(88.8) (56.7) (135.7) (65.9)
Share 65 years or more 334.7 87.0 190.5 58.3
(204.8) (122.8) (228.5) (125.8)
Constant 73.17 4.362 38.9 77.3
(114.8) (55.4) (104.9) (75.9)
N 10,133 9,735 10,133 9,735
Sample includes all municipalities in the Census years 1970 through 2000 with 2,500 residents that were not responsible for education services in 1970. Cells report the estimated coefficients from equation (2).
Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered by municipality. Columns 2 and 4 drop municipalities with the largest and smallest 1% of changes in either the Gini coefficient or the municipal revenues by decade.
Coefficient statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10%.
15 We rely on Card and Payne’s (2002) taxonomy of school finance
cases as updated by Baicker and Gordon (2006).
16 We find the $27 number by multiplying the general expenditure point
estimate in table 2 ($532.9) by the change in Gini coefficient (0.05).
1296 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
included in the vector of covariates. We find that municipa-
lities that were expanding in total population or had a grow-
ing black or Hispanic population share reduced public
expenditures over this period, while municipalities with ris-
ing median income increased public expenditures. A 10%
increase in median income among town residents is asso-
ciated with a $20 to $24 increase in expenditures per capita.
Although excluding outliers reduces the point estimates
somewhat, it also cuts the standard errors in half, notably
increasing the statistical power of the estimated relation-
ship. We continue to exclude these outliers throughout the
paper.
Table 3 investigates the relationship between changes in
the income distribution and changes in subcomponents of
municipality revenues and expenditures. If inequality
heightens crime, the extra spending associated with an in-
crease in inequality could be entirely dedicated to an ex-
panded police force. Instead, we find that a 5 point increase
in the Gini coefficient leads to a $4 increase in per capita
police spending (out of total additional expenditures of
$19); the remainder is spent on other ‘‘productive’’ public
services, including fire protection and local roads. Income
inequality has no relationship with spending on public
welfare and health and hospitals; however, together, these
categories represent less than 5% of the typical municipal
budget.
Table 3 also demonstrates that the revenues required to
fund these additional expenditures are collected using a
range of local tax instruments, including property taxes,
sales taxes, and direct charges for services. The one revenue
category that is not associated with a widening of the
income distribution is federal and state transfers. This result
is not surprising because the majority of state transfers to
local governments are provided to school districts, which
are examined in the next section, and because state transfers
to municipalities are based on formulas that often do not
take into account the local income distribution.
Thus far, we have documented that a widening of the
income distribution is associated with growth in municipal
revenues and expenditures. Yet the OLS results cannot rule
out a reverse relationship, whereby local spending attracts
households at the lower or upper end of the income distribu-
tion. Table 4 contains results from our instrumental vari-
ables analysis, in which we instrument for changes in the
actual Gini coefficient with changes in the Gini coefficient
for the predicted income distribution in an area. Most of the
IV coefficients are positive, statistically significant, and, if
anything, larger than their OLS counterparts.
















0.746*** 1768*** 496.4*** 596.9*** 327.7** 125.1* 56.8
[0.03] [389.7] [119.5] [169.2] [165.1] [69.4] [181.4]
IV Estimates: Expenditures
General







1345*** 269.8*** 137.7*** 31.14 4.78 32.7 1,399***
[402.0] [85.3] [45.7] [66.08] [3.00] [39.6] [360.2]
Sample includes all municipalities in Census years 1970 to 2000 with 2,500 residents that were not responsible for education services in 1970. We also drop municipalities with the largest and smallest 1% of
changes in either the Gini coefficient or the municipal revenues by decade. (N ¼ 9,735). Cells report the estimated coefficient on the change in the Gini coefficient from equation (2). The instrument for the actual Gini
coefficient is the Gini coefficient for the predicted local income distribution; see section IIIB for details. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by municipality. Coefficient statistically significant at ***1%, **5%,
and *10%.














382.4*** 120.6*** 26.9 104.2** 44.8** 0.86
[106.0] [25.2] [54.1] [45.4] [19.9] [50.3]
Expenditures
General







313.5*** 87.2*** 41.4*** 54.4*** 0.22 0.50 131.0
[117.8] [19.3] [9.7] [17.3] [0.98] [11.3] [108.1]
Sample includes all municipalities in Census years 1970 to 2000 with 2,500 residents that were not responsible for education services in 1970. We also drop municipalities with the largest and smallest 1% of
changes in either the Gini coefficient or the municipal revenues by decade (N ¼ 9,735). Cells report the estimated coefficient on the change in the Gini coefficient from equation (2). Standard errors in parentheses
and are clustered by municipality. Coefficient statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10%.
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If our OLS estimates were driven by reverse causality––
for example, because the rich are attracted to towns with
generous public services––we would expect the IV coeffi-
cients to be smaller than OLS. The fact that the IV esti-
mates are larger than OLS suggests that the instrumental
variables procedure may instead be correcting for measure-
ment error, which can bias estimates toward 0. By these
estimates, a 5 point increase in the Gini coefficient leads to
an $88 increase in expenditures per capita. From 1970 to
2000, the average municipality experienced a $408 increase
in revenues per capita. The widening of the income distri-
bution can thus explain 22% of the growth in the size of
local governments from 1970 to 2000 (¼ 88/408). Overall,
the pattern of both OLS and IV results suggests that income
inequality neither reduces the demand for municipal goods
and services nor limits residents’ ability to pay for them.
Table 5 compares the baseline IV relationship with
results from a number of alternate specifications. For com-
parison, we reproduce the main results in row 1. Overall,
we find that the Gini coefficient always has a positive effect
on local revenues and expenditures, although in some cases,
the estimated coefficient is no longer statistically different
from 0. It is notable that even after controlling for many
aspects of the local population, we do not find the negative
association between income inequality and public spending
posited in the existing literature.
The first set of alternative specifications explores the
effect of rising incomes at the top end of the income distri-
bution, which, by increasing both income inequality and the
size of the tax base, can create a mechanical relationship
between the two variables of interest. For example, if a por-
tion of extra income earned by the rich is used to improve
local real estate, the property tax base could increase in
value, allowing the municipality to raise more revenue at
the same tax rate. We measure rising inequality at the top
end of the income distribution in three ways: first, we
include indicators for the educational attainment of house-
hold heads in five categories; second, we control for mean,
rather than median, household income; and third, we in-
clude a fifth-order polynomial in the logarithm of median
income. In all cases, the relationship between the Gini coef-
ficient and municipal revenue or expenditure remains posi-
tive. For some specifications, the coefficient is cut in half or
more. We conclude that some portion of the estimated rela-
tionship is likely driven by the effect of rising top-end
inequality on the size of the local tax base.17
Our main results emphasize how changes in an area’s
income distribution affect local revenues and expenditures.
However, some municipalities, especially those in the
South, have a long history of inequality. Long-standing pat-
terns of inequality affect the construction of our instrumen-
tal variable, which is based on household composition in a
locality as of 1970, but could also have an independent
influence on both the level and trajectory of government
activity in an area. The fifth row of table 5 adds the initial
(1970) Gini coefficient alongside changes in the Gini coeffi-
cient by decade. We continue to find that a widening of the
income distribution is positively associated with municipal
revenues. In contrast, places that started out with high levels
of inequality in 1970 experience small declines in revenue
per capita, especially revenue from property taxes, over the
next few decades (not shown). Row 6 controls for state-
level time trends rather than just regional trends, and the
coefficients are still large and statistically significant.
The final rows of table 5 consider additional robustness
tests. Including outliers or dropping the race and ethnicity
controls preserves the positive relationship between income
inequality and local government activity, but the coeffi-
cients of interest are no longer statistically significant. We
also try estimating equation (1) with municipality fixed
effects instead of first differencing the data, as in equation
(2). In this case, we find an even larger relationship between
the Gini coefficient and municipal revenues.
These results suggest that the relationship between
income inequality and local government activity is not
entirely an artifact of top-end income growth, nor does it
only reflect the effect of long-standing differences in
inequality.
TABLE 5.—ALTERNATIVE IV SPECIFICATIONS, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME






1. Baseline 1,768*** 1,345***
[389.7] [402.0]
2. Five education categories 858.1 1,106
[767.7] [856.0]








5. Initial (1970) Gini 999.1 971.1
[624.3] [833.5]
6. With state time trends 1,747*** 1,426***
[396.4] [413.1]
7. Include outliers 997.3 1,144
[642.7] [699.1]




9. Without race controls 953.3 1,106
[638.4] [692.1]
Sample includes all municipalities in the Census years 1970 through 2000 with 2,500 residents that
were not responsible for education services in 1970. We also drop municipalities with the largest and
smallest 1% of changes in either the Gini coefficient or the municipal revenues by decade (N ¼ 9,735).
Each cell reports the coefficient from a different version of equation (2). Standard errors in parentheses
and are clustered by municipality. The first row repeats the baseline coefficient from table 2. Rows 2–10
include an additional set of explanatory variables as indicated. Coefficient statistically significant at
***1%, **5%, and *10%.
17 We also explore the robustness of our results to flexibly controlling
for the initial share of households in each of fifteen income bins underly-
ing the construction of the instrument. In particular, we are interested in
whether the estimated effect of changes in the Gini coefficient is driven
by the share of households in the top few income bins. Although these
shares are nearly colinear with the instrument itself, we can separately
include them, alongside the Gini coefficient itself, in the OLS regression.
The effect of the Gini coefficient is qualitatively similar when we include
these additional controls (for general revenue, coefficient ¼ 388.3, SE ¼
222.0; for general expenditures, coefficient ¼ 497.5, SE ¼ 219.7).
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B. Impact of Change in Racial Heterogeneity on
Municipalities
This section examines the effect of racial fractionaliza-
tion, another form of local heterogeneity, on municipal bud-
gets. Alesina et al. (1999) argue that although cities with a
racially diverse population spend more per resident, they
devote a smaller share of their budget to ‘‘productive’’ pub-
lic goods, such as roads, sewers, and trash collection. In
table 6, we reestimate equation (2), replacing the Gini coef-
ficient with an index of racial/ethnic fractionalization. Our
index is based on four racial/ethnic categories: white, non-
Hispanics; black, non-Hispanics; Hispanics; and other races
(which include Asians, Pacific Islanders, and American
Indians).18 For this specification, we also omit the separate
measures of black and Hispanic population share. We
improve the methodology used in Alesina et al. (1999) by
using a panel of cities from 1970 to 2000 rather than a sin-
gle cross-section in 1990 and by extending the analysis to
municipalities with fewer than 25,000 residents.
As in Alesina et al. (1999), we find that an increase in
racial heterogeneity is associated with larger municipal
expenditures and that a portion of this increase is due to
higher police spending. However, we also find large posi-
tive effects on fire protection and health and hospital spend-
ing. Because spending on roads fails to keep pace with the
overall increase in expenditures, the share of the budget
dedicated to roads does fall, which Alesina et al. (1999)
interpret as a decline in the share of revenue dedicated to
productive public goods. We contend that the interpretation
of these patterns are extremely sensitive to the classification
of municipal spending into ‘‘productive’’ versus ‘‘nonpro-
ductive’’ public goods. It is reasonable to believe that spend-
ing on fire protection and public hospitals is equally as pro-
ductive as spending on roads and, conversely, that spending
on roads is equally susceptible to corruption for patronage
purposes.
On the revenue side, we confirm Alesina et al.’s (1999)
finding that racial heterogeneity is associated with an
increase in intergovernmental transfers. However, we dis-
pute the interpretation that racially diverse cities are unwill-
ing to raise their own revenue and therefore need to be
subsidized by the state ‘‘to compensate . . . [for] the difficul-
ties . . . in directing local resources to the supply of public
goods’’ (p. 1266). Instead, we find that an increase in racial
diversity is also associated with an increase in own-source
revenue collection as well, including both revenue from
property taxes and sales taxes.
C. Impact of Income Inequality on School Districts
Turning to school districts, we begin in table 7 by esti-
mating the baseline specification, equation (2), which
relates decadal changes in income inequality to changes in
government activity. As for municipalities above, we find
here that an increase in income inequality among residents
of a school district is associated with rising expenditures
per pupil. However, the relationship between income
inequality and total expenditures per pupil is small. Accord-
ing to our IV estimate, a 3.4 point increase in the Gini coef-
ficient, the average increase at the school district level from
1970 to 2000, would result in expenditures of $129 per
pupil over those four decades. Recall that school district
expenditures per pupil are nearly an order of magnitude lar-
TABLE 7.—OLS AND IV ESTIMATES, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME INEQUALITY
AND SCHOOL DISTRICT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA, 1970–2000
Total Spending Property Tax State Transfers
OLS 1,007 2,565*** 2,754***
[656,3] [704.4] [591.8]
First-stage IV
0.745*** 3,783 15,103*** 20,478***
[0.04] [2857] [3880] [2169]
Sample includes school districts in Census years 1970–2000. We drop school districts with the largest
and smallest 1% of changes in either the Gini coefficient or the municipal revenues by decade (N ¼
25,605 or 8,535 school districts per year). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school district.
Cells report the estimated coefficient on the change in the Gini coefficient from equation (2). The instru-
ment for the actual Gini coefficient is based on a ‘‘synthetic’’ version of the local income distribution.
see section IIIB for details. Coefficient statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10%.














123.4*** 60.12*** 43.32** 8.28 37.86*** 10.81
[43.98] [11.73] [21.95] [18.27] [9.88] [21.52]
Expenditures
General







91.27* 39.21*** 13.09*** 7.19 0.46 8.74 15.77
[49.15] [9.04] [4.84] [6.92] [0.51] [6.01] [44.91]
Sample includes all municipalities in Census years 1970 to 2000 with 2,500 residents that were not responsible for education services in 1970. We also drop municipalities with the largest and smallest 1% of
changes in either the ethnic fractionalization index or the municipal revenues by decade (N ¼ 9,735). Cells report the estimated coefficient b from equation (2) but replacing the Gini coefficient by the index of racial
fractionalization. This specification also omits the separate measures of black and Hispanic population share. Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered by municipality. Coefficient statistically significant at
***1%, **5%, and *10%.
18 The racial fractionalization index is defined as 1 – Si (residents of
race or ethnicityi).
2 Separate counts of Asian and Pacific Islanders do not
exist at the municipal level in 1970 or 1980.
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ger than municipal expenditures per resident; therefore, this
increase would represent only 1.5% of the typical school
budget in the year 2000.
The small effect of inequality on total school resources in
column 1 masks countervailing trends for the two main
sources of revenue. According to the IV estimates, a 3.4
point increase in the Gini is associated with a $514 increase
in property tax revenue per pupil (column 2) and a corre-
sponding $697 decline in state transfers (column 3). That is,
in both municipalities and school districts, a widening
income distribution is associated with more own-source
revenue collection. However, rising inequality is also asso-
ciated with a compensating decline in state transfers to
school districts, a source that accounted for a majority of
school revenues over this period. We then test whether this
pattern is stronger in states with systems of school finance
equalization in place that may have undermined the asso-
ciation between local income distribution and local revenue
collection.
Table 8 presents results from our estimation of equation
(3), which allows the effect of income inequality on school
district finances to vary with a state’s system of school
finance. For this specification, we report OLS coefficients
because the instrument is not sufficiently powerful to explain
changes in inequality over this thirty-year interval.19 The
first panel replicates the basic specification over this thirty-
year period (comparable to table 7); in the second panel, we
allow the relationships between changes in a district’s level
of income inequality and median income to differ in states
with and without court-ordered school finance reform.
The first row of table 8 shows that states under court
order to reform their system of school finance provide a
higher level of state transfers per pupil (see also Card &
Payne, 2002). By 2000, the average district under court
order received an additional $396 of state funding per pupil,
which translates into $427 of additional spending per pupil.
As in table 7, we document that school districts in which
the income distribution widened between 1970 and 2000
raise more revenue per pupil from property taxation, which
is entirely offset by a corresponding decline in state trans-
fers. Panel 2 demonstrates that the relationship between
income inequality and school expenditures is mediated by
court supervision of a state’s system of school finance. In
districts whose state system of school finance is not under
court supervision, the increase in property taxes associated
with rising inequality is only partially offset by a decline in
state transfers, such that a 3.4 point increase in the Gini
would lead to a $116 increase in total resources per pupil.
However, in states with strong equalization programs, the
excess taxing capacity that accompanies rising income
inequality is completely offset by reductions in state aid.
Table 8 also reports the relationship between educational
expenditures and the median income of a school district’s
residents. Not surprisingly, wealthier districts spend more
on education per pupil. On average, a 10% increase in med-
ian income is associated with a increase of in $106 per pupil
expenditures. This relationship is driven by an increase in
locally raised revenue. In all states, districts with higher
median incomes receive fewer transfers from the state. The
reduction in state funds more than doubles in states under
court order to equalize their systems of school finance.
V. Conclusion
The income distribution in the United States widened
greatly from 1970 to 2000. We use variation in income dis-
persion at the local level to examine the relationship
between income inequality and the size of the public sector.
Contrary to models that emphasize disagreements between
residents of heterogeneous societies over the optimal level
of public expenditures, we find that rising income inequal-
ity is associated with larger increases in tax revenues and
faster growth in public expenditures at municipality and
school district levels.
TABLE 8.—OLS ESTIMATES: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME INEQUALITY AND SCHOOL DISTRICT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES PER PUPIL, 1970 AND 2000
Panel 1 Panel 2
Total Spending Property Tax State Transfers Total Spending Property Tax State Transfers
Court order (SFR) 427.7** 104.0 396.2 2,922 9,328 16,860***
[179.3] [180.7] [274.2] [3,389] [5980] [4856]
Gini coefficient 3,212** 6,792*** 6,568*** 3,453* 5,027** 3,829**
[1,553] [1,530] [1,607] [1,665] [1,874] [1,622]
Gini  SFR 244.9 4,086* 5,257*
[2,335] [2,246] [2,940]
ln(median income) 1,061*** 2,009*** 1,792*** 1,197*** 1,629*** 1,080*
[241.8] [406.3] [459.6] [221.5] [535.5] [575.9]
ln(median)  SFR 240 740.4 1,354***
[254.6] [498.0] [390.0]
Sample includes school districts in Census years 1970 and 2000. We drop school districts with the largest and smallest 1% of changes in either the Gini coefficient or the municipal revenues by decade (N ¼ 8,535
school districts). Cells report the estimated coefficients of equation (3). SFR is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the year 2000 for the fourteen states whose systems of school finance were deemed unconstitutional
by the state supreme court. Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered by school district. Coefficient statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10%.
19 The first-stage coefficient on the decadal specification at the school
district level is 0.745 (SE ¼ 0.04), whereas the coefficient on the first
stage for the long-run specification is 0.213 (SE ¼ 0.115). As is common
with weak instruments, the second-stage coefficients are large and impre-
cise in the long-run specification, and hence table 8 reports only the OLS
estimates.
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Revenues and expenditures per resident increased in
nearly all communities over this period. Our best causal esti-
mates suggest that a 4 to 5 point increase in the Gini coeffi-
cient, around the magnitude of change experienced by the
average locality from 1970 to 2000, leads to increase in
municipal expenditures of $88 per resident to cover services
like police and fire protection and infrastructure mainte-
nance and an increase in locally raised school expenditures
of $514 per pupil. Within school districts, much of the rise
in own-source revenue accompanying an increase in
inequality was offset by a decline in state transfers, with the
size of the offset doubling in states under court order to
equalize school funding across districts. By our estimate, the
widening of the income distribution can explain around 20%
of the growth in municipal expenditures over the period.
We conclude by noting that although income inequality
is associated with greater public expenditures, it is not clear
that additional funds necessarily translate into a larger
quantity or higher quality of public goods. Furthermore, the
incidence of local taxation and the distribution of local ser-
vices need not be progressive and likely varies substantially
across governmental units. Hence, we stop short of claim-
ing that local government activity wholly or partially com-
pensates for the potential social ills associated with income
inequality. However, given the empirical patterns documen-
ted here, we argue that it is unlikely that the social ills cor-
related with inequality are due to a weakening of the public
sector.
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